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The toy model used by Spekkens [R. Spekkens, Phys. Rev. A 75, 032110 (2007)] to argue in favor
of an epistemic view of quantum mechanics is extended by generalizing his definition of pure states
(i.e. states of maximal knowledge) and by associating measurements with all pure states. The new
toy model does not allow signaling but, in contrast to the Spekkens model, does violate Bell-CHSH
inequalities. Negative probabilities are found to arise naturally within the model, and can be used
to explain the Bell-CHSH inequality violations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years various foundational principles have
been put forward for quantum mechanics that are con-
cerned with information [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The hope is to
formulate simple principles from which one can derive
quantum mechanics, much as special relativity can be
derived from the principle of relativity: that the laws of
physics are the same in any inertial reference frame.
A concrete example of such a principle [6] relevant to
the present paper is that an elementary system carries
one bit of information, i.e., the truth value to a single
binary proposition. This principle allows one, according
to Zeilinger [6], to explain the randomness in quantum
mechanics when considering measurements correspond-
ing to other, different propositions. However, Timpson
[7] pointed out that Zeilinger’s principle does not lead to
quantum mechanics. That objection seems valid: after
all, a classical bit certainly satisfies the above definition
of an elementary system. Moreover, one must be careful
here to distinguish information encoded in a system, in-
formation needed to describe a system, and information
obtained from measuring a system. Whereas in classical
physics the three may well be (in principle if not in prac-
tice) the same, in quantum mechanics they are certainly
not [8].
Spekkens [9] added a crucial ingredient to Zeilinger’s
principle. He showed that many features of quantum
mechanics can be reproduced when requiring that an el-
ementary system, in addition to answering one binary
question, also leaves one binary question unanswered.
More precisely, Spekkens presented a toy model in which
physical states describe partial knowledge about hidden
variables. That is, physical states correspond to epis-
temic states (states of knowledge) in which the knowledge
one has about the values of quantities describing the un-
derlying ontic state (a state of reality) is limited. His
“knowledge balance principle” states that the number of
questions that are answered in a physical state can be at
most equal to the number of questions left unanswered.
In a state of maximal knowledge (which will be called
pure states here [23]), one knows the answers to exactly
half of the total number of questions necessary to specify
the ontic state.
If we assume the ontic state is fully described by an
even number of variables each taking on one of a fixed
number p values, then for a pure state one knows the val-
ues of exactly half of those variables. For p = 2 one knows
one bit of information and thus the Spekkens model in-
cludes and extends the above-mentioned foundational
principle proposed by Zeilinger. The main point of the
(purely classical) Spekkens model is that it reproduces
many features of quantum mechanics usually considered
nonclassical. For instance, the toy model describes tele-
portation, superdense coding, a no-cloning theorem, and
the noncommutativity of measurements, just to name a
few [9]. But one quantum feature not reproduced by the
model is violations of Bell-CHSH inequalities [10, 11].
We will consider here a natural generalization of that
toy model by allowing pure states to correspond to partial
knowledge about more than half of the variables. More
importantly, we will associate a measurement and an ob-
servable with every pure state. A pure state will still
correspond to having “half the information” needed to
specify the ontic state, and various measures of informa-
tion will be considered to specify what exactly “half the
information” means. The main point is that this exten-
sion turns out to reproduce even more salient features of
quantum mechanics, in particular violations of the Bell-
CHSH inequalities. The extension actually connects the
Spekkens toy model with ”generalized probability theo-
ries” as considered in Refs. [2, 3, 4, 12, 13]. The lat-
ter theories consider probabilities for measurement out-
comes, while in Spekkens model the probabilities refer to
knowledge about an underlying state of reality. The cor-
respondence between the two probability distributions,
or the lack thereof, is in fact crucial for the present toy
model.
II. TOY MODEL
A. Observables and measurements
In our toy model an elementary system is described
by two independent variables Xa and Xb, that each can
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2take on p different values, where p is a prime number [24].
Those systems will be referred to as “elementary systems
of type p.”
The total number of different values taken by the two
variables is then N = p2 (and this is also the number
of distinct ontic states). The values taken on by the
variables X = (Xa, Xb) are denoted by x = (xa, xb),
with
xa,b ∈ {0, 1, . . . p− 1}.
More precisely, we will assume henceforth the values are
taken in Fp, the field of integers modulo p, equipped with
multiplication and addition. For the moment we define a
pure state to be a state where we know the value of one
particular variable and nothing else. This variable could
be Xa or Xb, or more generally any variable of the form
kaXa + kbXb,
with ka,b ∈ Fp. Thus we restrict ourselves to “observ-
ables” that are linear functions of Xa and Xb. We have
p2− 1 nontrivial observables that can take on p different
values, and the trivial observable ≡ 0.
Now the observables that we defined are in fact not all
different, as we can always divide out a nonzero factor ka
or kb, to write either
kaXa + kbXb = ka(Xa + kbk−1a Xb) for ka 6= 0,
or
kaXa + kbXb = kb(kak−1b Xa + Xb) for kb 6= 0.
Thus we can use as different nontrivial observables the
set
O = {X0 = Xa;Xk+1 = Xb + kXa, for k = 0 . . . p− 1},
(1)
whose size is R = |O| = p + 1. In a pure epistemic state
exactly one value of the observables in O is specified.
Thus there are p(p + 1) different pure epistemic states.
These p+ 1 observables Xi for i = 0 . . . p are mutually
unbiased, in that knowledge of one such variable tells one
nothing about the value of another variable. This implies,
for instance, that we can assign any pair of observables
out of the set O to represent the ontic state. In other
words, the space of observables (not of states!) is a 2-D
vector space over the field Fp, and in it we can distinguish
R = p+1 different rays (vectors up to an overall irrelevant
factor) that act as different (but obviously not linearly
independent) observables.
For each observable there are measurements associated
with it: The allowed measurements in the toy model an-
swer a question of the form “is the value of the variable
Xi equal to xi?”. This model is the algebraic formula-
tion of the Spekkens model for p = 2 and generalizes it for
other prime numbers p. In the Appendix we will present
the graphical representation of Spekkens’ toy model, in-
cluding the present extension of the model.
B. Measures of information and pure states
So far we have defined pure states as states for which
we know the value of exactly one observable. These pure
states are identical to the pure states defined in [9] for
p = 2. Let us call these pure states the canonical pure
states of a system of type p.
We can extend the definition of pure states, as follows.
Suppose we assign to a system of type p a probability dis-
tribution for the possible values of 2 observables, say, Xa
and Xb, denoted by P (xa, xb). Now the amount of infor-
mation we have can be quantified for any such function P
provided we use some particular measure of information
(or perhaps we should say “predictability” rather than
“information”). Such measures can be constructed from
reasonable axioms, discussed in, e.g., [14]. The axioms
single out a class of measures Mr of predictability, cor-
responding to Schur-convex functions, parametrized by a
real number r,
Mr(P ) =
(∑
x
P (x)(P (x))r
)1/r
, (2)
where the sum is over all possible values of x = (xa, xb).
Here we need r > −1 in order for Mr to be strictly
Schur convex [14]. Strict Schur convexity ensures that
predictability increases when the probability distribution
is “more concentrated.”
If we could know the value of both variables Xa and Xb,
we would have P (x0) = 1 for one particular value x = x0
with all other probabilities being zero. We would thus
have Mr(P ) = 1. Knowing only one variable, but nothing
about the other variables, corresponds to a probability
distribution where P (x) = 1/p for p different values x and
zero for the remaining ones. Then we have Mr(P ) = 1/p.
This value corresponds to a pure state in our toy model.
To see in what sense this value is “halfway” between
full knowledge and no knowledge at all, consider that
Mr(P ) = 1/p2 when we have P (x) = 1/p2 for all x. [So
we could use log2(Mr(P )) as an additive measure of pre-
dictability.] Note that the value of Mr(P ), for any value
of r, does not depend on having singled out the observ-
ables Xa and Xb rather than some other pair from the
set O, as choosing a different pair merely corresponds to
relabeling the values of the observables.
We now define a pure state to correspond simply to
any probability distribution P such that Mr(P ) = 1/p.
Thus we have the following crucial rule of our toy model:
Pure state of 1 system of type p : Mr(P ) = 1/p. (3)
We have to make a choice for r in order to make this
definition unique. Indeed, in general a probability distri-
bution P that is pure for a particular value of r is not
pure for different values of r. The canonical pure states,
on the other hand, are pure for any value of r.
There are two obvious choices for r: we could choose
r = 1, which would correspond to the measure of in-
formation advocated by Brukner and Zeilinger in [15] as
3being most useful in quantum mechanics, or we could
choose r → 0 in which case Mr(P ) = 2−H(P ), with
H(P ) = −∑i pi log2 pi the Shannon entropy. At this
point, though, we do not make any choice yet.
C. An equivalent characterization of pure states
We have defined pure states in terms of the joint prob-
ability distribution P for the variables Xa and Xb. There
are p2 − 1 independent probabilities P (xa, xb). Alterna-
tively, we could use the probabilities for the p+1 observ-
ables Xi, i = 1 . . . p+ 1 in the set O to take on the differ-
ent values xj ∈ Fp. Let us denote those probabilities by
Qi(xj). Each probability distribution Qi is determined
by p − 1 independent values Qi(xj) for j = 0, . . . p − 2,
and so there are (p − 1)(p + 1) = p2 − 1 independent
probabilities Qi(xj). This is the same number as the
number of independent probabilitites P (xa, xb). Indeed,
one probability distribution can be expressed in terms of
the other. We have, in particular, the definition of Qi in
terms of P :
Qi(x) =
∑
xa,xb|xi(xa,xb)=x
P (xa, xb). (4)
Here we define, in analogy to (1),
x0(xa, xb) = xa;
xk+1(xa, xb) = xb + kxa, for k = 0 . . . p− 1.
Conversely, we find by summing this relation over all i,
using that
∑
xa,xb
P (xa, xb) = 1, and rearranging terms,
pP (xa, xb) = −1 +
∑
i
Qi(xi(xa, xb))
=
∑
i
{
Qi(xi(xa, xb))− 1
p + 1
}
(5)
So instead of using Mr(P ) as our measure of information
to determine what pure states are, we might as well use
the probability distributions {Qi} and write
Mr(P ) =
∑
xa,xb
[
1
p
∑
i
{
Qi(xi(xa, xb))− 1
p + 1
}]r+11/r
:= Nr({Qi}). (6)
We could view the description of a pure state in terms of
the probability distributions {Qi} an instrumentalist de-
scription, as it only refers to quantities that can be mea-
sured. In fact, except for the restriction that Nr({Qi}) ≤
1/p, the instrumentalist description corresponds to the
representation of states used in [2, 3, 4, 12, 13] in terms
of probabilities for outcomes of a fiducial set of measure-
ments, where in our case the fiducial set is O.
While the transition from epistemic to instrumental
states may be quite natural, the measure of information
Nr({Qi}) looks artificial. On the other hand, in the spe-
cial case r = 1 we get after some algebraic manipulations
the simpler and perhaps more natural-looking relations
M1(P ) =
1
p
∑
i
M1(Qi)− 1
p
(7)
=
1
p
∑
i
∑
x
(
Qi(x)− 1
p
)2
+
1
p2
. (8)
Thus in the case of r = 1 we see that Mr(P ) is determined
by the sum over i of the same measure Mr applied to the
probability distributions Qi, Mr(Qi).
In discussing the merits of M1 as a measure of infor-
mation Timpson in [7] noted there is no particular reason
to sum Mr(Qi) over i for any r. However, we see here
that for r = 1 there is in fact a good reason, it quantifies
the information in the underlying epistemic probability
distribution P , through the relation (7).
D. Multiple systems and signaling
Consider now N > 1 systems of type p, denoted by
a superscript(n) where n = 1 . . . N . We use the joint
probability distribution P (X(1)a , X
(1)
b , . . . X
(N)
a , X
(N)
b ) to
define pure (epistemic) states, in a straightforward exten-
sion of the previous discussion. Namely, we will require
Mr(P ) = (1/p)N for a pure state of N systems of type
p. In the simplest case this corresponds to knowing ex-
actly the values of N variables out of the 2N independent
variables describing the N systems. Moreover, we must
require that for each marginal probability distribution
P ′ describing some subset of N ′ < N systems, we have
Mr(P ′) ≤ (1/p)N ′ , in order not to violate the knowledge
balance principle for the subsystems. However, this is
not the only restriction placed on pure states.
For example, suppose we could have a state of two
systems of type 2, characterized by X(1)a = X
(2)
a and
X
(1)
b = 0. If we just consider the amount of informa-
tion we have about such a state, then we see we know
two bits of information about the joint system (1, 2), we
know one bit about system 1 alone, and nothing about
system 2 alone. Without further restrictions this would
be an allowed pure state of 2 systems. However, such
a state was excluded by Spekkens in his toy model, and
here we will disallow it as well. The reason is that a mea-
surement on system 2 of the variable X(2)a would give too
much information about system 1: both X(1)a and X
(1)
b
would be known to us. Alternatively, we could impose
the condition that the variable X(1)b would be random-
ized because of the measurement of X(2)a in order to keep
the knowledge balance intact. But the cure would be
worse than the disease, as it would allow signaling: the
randomization of the value of Xb of system 1 could be
detected (with 50% probability at least), and would sig-
nal the fact that on system 2 (possibly located far from
system 1) a measurement of Xa was performed.
4E. Extending the set of observables and
measurements
From now on we only consider the simplest case p = 2.
Suppose we have the (instrumental) state S characterized
by the probabilities
S : Q0(1) = 0.9
Q1(1) = 0.9
Q2(0) = 0.8
r ≈ −0.147. (9)
The value of r was chosen so as to have Nr({Qi}) = 1/2,
so that S is a pure state. The underlying epistemic state
is given by the probabilities
P (1, 1) = 0.8
P (0, 1) = P (1, 0) = 0.1
P (0, 0) = 0, (10)
such that Mr(P ) = 1/2 for r ≈ −0.147. For a system
in the state S we can guess the values of two observables
(namely Xa and Xb) quite well, and we are slightly worse
informed about the third observable (Xa + Xb).
Now we wish to define a measurement corresponding
to the pure state S, just as we associated measurements
with the canonical pure states. Since p = 2 we need to
define a binary question. The question we allow as a
valid measurement is simply this: “is the system in state
S or not?” It is quite natural to assume that the prob-
abilities of getting the answer “yes” to this question for
the canonical pure states can be read off from the defini-
tion of the state S: if we have a system in a pure state
where we know the variable Xi to be equal to xi, then
we simply declare the probability of finding the system
in state S be Qi(xi). The reason for this choice is that,
conversely, the probability of finding the result Xi = xi
when measuring the variable Xi on a system in the state
S is given by the same number, Qi(xi), by definition of
the state S.
How should we define the state S⊥ corresponding to
the answer “no, the system is not in the state S”? Here
is one natural way of defining the state S⊥: Suppose
we start out with a state about which we know nothing.
That is, we have a maximally mixed state described by
Qi(xi) = 0.5 for all i. Then suppose we perform the
measurement S vs S⊥, but we forget the outcome. Then
we should still ascribe the same mixed state, as we did
not gain any information. Thus, an equal mixture of the
states S and S⊥ should be equivalent to the maximally
mixed state. This uniquely defines S⊥ to be
S⊥ : Q0(1) = 0.1
Q1(1) = 0.1
Q2(0) = 0.2
r ≈ −0.147. (11)
That is, we just complement the probabilities Qi(xi) →
1 − Qi(xi). This can be accomplished by the mapping
P (xa, xb) → 1/2 − P (xa, xb), or equivalently by xi →
1 − xi. All this is easily generalized to arbitrary pure
states for arbitrary values of r.
We also require that a system in state S will always
answer “yes” to the question, “are you in S?”. This as-
sumption is not as innocent as it may appear: it leads to
an infinite ontological excess baggage, as was explained
by Hardy [3].
III. VIOLATING BELL-CHSH INEQUALITIES
Perhaps surprisingly, the toy model as we have defined
it allows for violations of Bell-CHSH inequalities [10, 11].
A crucial role is played by the extended set of observables
and measurements of Section II E.
For example, suppose we start out with a state of two
systems in which we know
X(1)a = X
(2)
a
and
X
(1)
b = X
(2)
b .
This describes a pure state of 2 systems, in which we
know exactly 2 independent variables out of a total of 4.
We know nothing about each system individually, but the
two systems are perfectly (and maximally) correlated. As
shown in [9] such a state has many properties in common
with a maximally entangled state of two qubits. For ex-
ample, (i) teleportation is possible with such states, (ii)
although the state of the two systems together is pure,
the reduced states of the two subsystems are completely
random (“mixed”), and (iii) superdense coding is pos-
sible. On the other hand, in the Spekkens toy model
Bell-CHSH inequalitites cannot be violated with such a
state.
In addition to the pure state S defined in Section II E
we need to define one more pure state and its associated
measurement. We define a state S′ and its orthogonal
complement S′⊥ by the probabilities
S′ : Q0(1) = 0.9
Q1(0) = 0.8
Q2(1) = 0.9
S′⊥ : Q0(1) = 0.1
Q1(0) = 0.2
Q2(1) = 0.1
r ≈ −0.147. (12)
This state is a “rotated” version of the state S, as it can
be obtained from S by rotating Xb → Xa → Xa +Xb →
Xb. This state S′ and its orthogonal complement S′⊥
define another binary measurement.
Now contemplate performing measurements of the
variables X(1)a and X
(1)
b on system 1, and measurements
S(2) and S′(2) on system 2. The joint probabilities of the
5various possible outcomes are easily calculated straight
from the definitions (9)–(12). To see that such joint prob-
abilities indeed can be defined, consider the following. If
we first measure the variable X(1)a on system 1 then sys-
tem 2 will ”collapse” into a state with the same value for
X
(2)
a as measured for system 1. A subsequent measure-
ment of S(2) or S′(2) is then found to have the answer
”yes” with the probabilities determined by (9)–(12). On
the other hand, if we first measure S(2) or S′(2) then sys-
tem 1 is collapsed to one of the states S or S⊥, or S′ or
S′⊥ depending on the outcome of the measurement on
system 2 (this follows from the fact the initial state is
perfectly correlated and repeated measurements on sys-
tem 2 will persist in yielding the same answer as the first
time). The probabilities for the various outcomes of mea-
surements of X(1)a or X
(1)
b again follow from (9)–(12).
Hence the order of the measurements does not matter,
and a joint probability distribution for the outcomes can
be defined.
Moreover, because of the property that an equal mix-
ture of S and S⊥ or of S′ and S′⊥ is equal to the maxi-
mally mixed state implies that signaling is impossible.
Back to the Bell inequalities. Suppose, for concrete-
ness, we find X(1)a = 1. We then infer that X
(2)
a = 1 as
well, from the definition of the bipartite state. Then,
if we measure the observable S(2), we get the result
“yes” with probability Q0(1) = 0.9, whereas if we mea-
sure S′(2), we get the answer “yes” with probability
Q0(1) = 0.9. If on the other hand, we measure X
(1)
b
on system 1 and find it to be, say, X(1)b = 1 then we
know X(2)b = 1. We thus get the outcome “yes” af-
ter a measurement of S(2) on system 2 with probability
Q1(1) = 0.9 and the outcome S′ on system 2 with prob-
ability Q1(1) = 0.2. We can now easily construct the
standard Bell-CHSH inequality |B| ≤ 2 by defining
B := 〈X(1)a (1)S(2) + X(1)b (1)S(2) +
X(1)a (1)S
′(2) −X(1)b (1)S′(2)〉, (13)
where the answer “yes” counts as 1 and “no” as -1. For
the particular states S and S′ we have defined here we
find Br=−0.147 = 3× (0.9−0.1)− (0.2−0.8) = 3. The vi-
olation allowed by quantum mechanics is BQM = 2
√
2 ≈
2.8284, and so the toy theory with r = −0.147 allows
a stronger violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality than
does quantum mechanics: it violates Tsirel’son’s inequal-
ity [16].
We can numerically maximize the Bell-CHSH param-
eter |B| as a function of the parameter r, by maximiz-
ing over the possible pure states S and S′ in the sce-
nario analyzed above. The result is displayed in Fig-
ure 1. For small values of r the violation of the Bell in-
equality reaches its logical limit Bmax = 4, where as for
large values of r the violation becomes arbitrarily small,
and limr→∞Br = 2. All these toy models, then, vio-
late Bell-CHSH inequalities but do not allow signaling.
This is true even for the toy model corresponding to the
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FIG. 1: Maximum violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality as a
function of the parameter r using measurements correspond-
ing to pure states with Mr(P ) = 1/2.
limit r → −1. This limit then mimics the so-called PR
(Popescu-Rohrlich [17]) box, which allows the strongest
possible correlations |B| = 4 without allowing signaling.
But why can we violate a Bell-CHSH inequality in the
toy model at all? Isn’t it still a local hidden-variable
model? The answer is no, because the states S⊥ and
S′⊥ actually do not correspond to valid epistemic states!
Namely, the underlying probability distribution P for
those “states” necessarily has negative values. Indeed,
consider the values of Q for S⊥. With 90% probability
we have that Xa = 0 and with the same probability we
have that Xb = 0, but somehow Xa + Xb = 1 with 80%
probability. It is easy to verify this can happen only if we
assume a negative probability for P (1, 1). Indeed, using
the relation (5) between Q and P we get P (1, 1) = −0.3.
This is the point, then, where we have crucially deviated
from Spekkens’ toy model. We do have valid instrumen-
tal states but there are no longer valid epistemic states
corresponding to S⊥ and S′⊥.
Neither of the special cases r = 0 or r = 1 corresponds
to the exact violation BQM = 2
√
2 allowed by quantum
mechanics. However, we can go one step further. The
states S and S′ that we defined correspond to valid pure
epistemic states, with all probabilities 1 ≥ P (xa, xb) ≥ 0,
and only S⊥ and S′⊥ do not. But once we have taken
that step we may as well define measurements that make
use of two negative-probability states, S˜ and S˜⊥. In that
case, though, we have in general a problem calculating
the measure Mr(P ). Indeed, only for odd integer values
of r can we make sense of P (x)r+1 for negative values of
P (x). In particular then, let us take r = 1, and consider
any pure states as defined by N1({Qi}) = 1/2, including
those with negative probabilities P . As is easily verified,
one obtains the maximum violation of the Bell-CHSH in-
equality by using the following two states to define mea-
surements:
S˜ : Q0(1) = 1/2 +
√
2/4
6Q1(1) = 1/2 +
√
2/4
Q2(0) = 1/2
r = 1, (14)
and
S˜′ : Q0(1) = 1/2 +
√
2/4
Q1(1) = 1/2−
√
2/4
Q2(0) = 1/2
r = 1, (15)
while using the same quantity B of Eq. (13). These states
and their orthogonal complements do correspond to pure
states according to the measure N1, but all 4 states have
some negative probabilities P . The violation of the Bell-
CHSH inequality with these measurements is B1 = 2
√
2,
identical to the quantum-mechanical value BQM . This
observation, then, provides an additional reason for using
r = 1 as a measure of information useful for quantum
mechanics [15].
The question has been posed [17] why quantum me-
chanics, without admitting signaling, allows a finite vi-
olation of the Bell-CHSH inequalities but not the maxi-
mum. The present toy model has the same property as
quantum mechanics. The value r = 1 is the smallest
value compatible with the knowledge balance principle
even when allowing negative probabilities, and it leads
to the largest violation. The models with other odd inte-
ger values for r violate Bell-CHSH inequalities by smaller
amounts.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We extended the toy model presented by Spekkens in
Ref. [9] by generalizing both his definition of pure states
(states of maximal knowledge) and his knowledge balance
principle. Our extended model gets even closer to quan-
tum mechanics than the Spekkens model already does.
In particular, although the Spekkens model does not vi-
olate Bell-CHSH inequalities, ours does. In fact, we can
get the correct maximum violation of the Bell-CHSH in-
equalities by using a particular measure of information;
namely the measure of information advocated by Brukner
and Zeilinger as being relevant for quantum mechanics,
rather than the Shannon entropy. Perhaps our toy model
thus sheds some light on the discussions in Refs. [7, 15]
about the roles various measures of information could or
should play in quantum mechanics.
Our toy model violates Bell-CHSH inequalities not by
giving up locality (in the sense that quantum mechanics
itself is a local theory: it is only hidden-variable models
mimicking quantum mechanics that are nonlocal) but by
allowing negative probabilities for the underlying epis-
temic states that define the physical states of the toy
model. The instrumental states that can be constructed
by writing down probabilities of certain fiducial mea-
surements are still characterized by valid (non-negative)
probability distributions. That negative probabilitities,
in the form of negative values of an appropriate Wigner
function, may be used to indicate or explain nonclassical
features has been known for a long time [18, 19]. The
probability distributions used in our toy model are not
quite the same as discrete Wigner functions for finite-
dimensional quantum systems, although they certainly
do have many features in common (see, e.g., [20, 21] and
references therein). In particular, those Wigner func-
tions are derived from quantum mechanics, whereas the
toy model we considered here is different from quantum
mechanics, as was already shown by Spekkens in [9]. In
particular, there are 4 toy-model states similar to the
4 Bell states [maximally entangled state of two qubits].
But the toy-model states display different types of corre-
lations and/or anti-correlations than do the Bell states.
For example, whereas no quantum-mechanical state of
two qubits displays perfect correlations between three
mutually unbiased observables, the toy model pure state
characterized by X(1)a = X
(2)
a and X
(1)
b = X
(2)
b does. It
would nevertheless be interesting to study the precise re-
lations between the discrete Wigner functions of [20] or of
[21] in particular, and the probabilities P and Q defined
here.
The fact that the toy model comes close to quantum
mechanics but is not quantum mechanics is a good prop-
erty, we would argue. We should be less surprised if
we reproduce many quantum-mechanical features from a
“toy model” that starts out with, say, complex Hilbert
spaces, a tensor product structure, and Hermitian oper-
ators. But a smaller surprise gives us less information.
The agreement of the toy model with many features
of quantum mechanics once more indicates the impor-
tance of the concept of information and states of knowl-
edge in the quest to understand quantum mechanics
[1, 6, 9]. Some open questions still remain about the
toy model: Does the Kochen-Specker theorem apply to
the toy model? That is, are the measurements we con-
sidered contextual? A different type of question is: Can
one define the equivalent of a SIC-POVM [22] in the toy
model?
Appendix
Here we present a graphical representation of the toy
model, similar to the one used by Spekkens in [9]. An
elementary system of type 2 consists of a box with 4
compartments. A state of reality, an ontic state, is a
state where one and only one of the compartments is
filled. For example, see Figure 2.
A physical state corresponds to an epistemic state, in
which our knowledge about which compartment is filled
is limited. In a canonical pure state we know that one
of two compartments is filled, but we have no idea which
one of the two. An example is given in Figure 3.
We associate with each pure state a measurement or
an observable, i.e. a binary question that we can ask
7FIG. 2: An example of an ontic state, in which one particular
compartment of the box is filled. Corresponds to a state Xa =
Xb = 0.
FIG. 3: An example of an epistemic state, in which we know
that exactly one of two particular compartments of the box
is filled, but we do not know which one. Corresponds to the
state Xa = 0.
the system. We can ask the system whether one of two
particular compartments are filled or not. An example
of such a measurement is depicted in Figure 4. The de-
picted observable corresponds to the algebraic question,
“is Xa = 0” or not? That is, it corresponds to the ob-
servable X0. The most general epistemic state allowed is
one where we assign 4 probabilities P (xa, xb), such that a
suitable measure of information Mr (defined in Eq. (2))
has a particular value, namely, Mr(P ) = 1/2 for pure
states and Mr(P ) < 1/2 for all other states. When we
allow the probabilities P to become negative for some
entries, but without allowing negative probabilities for
measurement outcomes, we can violate Bell-CHSH in-
equalities.
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8FIG. 4: An example of an allowed measurement, associated
with the pure state of Figure 3. We can ask whether one of
the upper two compartments is filled or not. This corresponds
to the question whether Xa = 0 or not.
FIG. 5: An example of a more general epistemic state, in
which we have assigned some probability for each compart-
ment to be filled. P satisfies
∑
ij
P (i, j) = 1 and Mr(P ) ≤
1/2. Moreover, the two entries in one column, or in one row,
or in one diagonal, must sum to a positive number. In the
extended toy model, one entry may be negative.
